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Abstract  
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) is a prospective quality assurance methodology, 
increasingly used in health care, which identifies potential vulnerabilities in complex, high 
risk processes and generates remedial actions.  We aimed, for the first time, to apply FMEA 
in a social care context to evaluate the process for recognising and referring children exposed 
to domestic abuse within one Midlands city safeguarding area in England. A multi-
disciplinary, multi-agency team of ten front line professionals undertook the FMEA, using a 
modified methodology, over seven group meetings. The FMEA included mapping out the 
process under evaluation to identify its component steps, identifying failure modes (potential 
errors) and possible causes for each step, and generating corrective actions. In this paper we 
report the output from the FMEA, including illustrative examples of the failure modes and 
corrective actions generated. We also present an analysis of feedback from the FMEA team 
and provide future recommendations for the use of FMEA in appraising social care processes 
and practice. Although challenging, the FMEA was unequivocally valuable for team 
members and generated a significant number of corrective actions locally for the 
safeguarding board to consider in its response to children exposed to domestic abuse. 
Keywords 
Child safeguarding; child protection; domestic violence; practitioner research; 
multidisciplinary work; failure mode and effects analysis   
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Bullet Points 
What is known about this topic 
 Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) is a prospective quality assurance 
methodology increasingly used in health care to identify potential vulnerabilities in 
complex, high risk processes and generate remedial actions.   
 FMEA has not to date been used to evaluate and improve the quality and safety of social 
care processes.   
What this paper adds  
 First study to explore the feasibility and utility of using a modified FMEA methodology 
to evaluate an aspect of a child safeguarding social care process (recognising and 
referring children exposed to domestic abuse). 
 Reports a summary of the FMEA output, evaluative feedback from the FMEA team, and 
recommendations for using a prospective systems approach in appraising social care 
processes and practice.   
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Introduction  
Domestic abuse is a universal public health concern (Garcia-Moreno & Watts 2011). 
Worldwide, almost one third of all women who have been in a relationship have been 
physically and/or sexually assaulted by an intimate male partner (World Health Organisation 
(WHO) 2013).  As well as leading to significant long-term damage to women’s health and 
wellbeing (Garcia-Moreno & Watts 2011, WHO 2013), children who live with domestic 
abuse can experience fear and anxiety, low self-esteem and difficulties at school, and are at a 
greatly increased risk of experiencing abuse and maltreatment themselves (McGuigan & Pratt 
2001, Buckley et al. 2007, Holt et al. 2008). The impact of domestic abuse can endure for 
children long after measures have been taken to ensure their safety (Holt et al. 2008), and 
numerous studies have shown that adverse childhood experiences, such as directly or 
indirectly experiencing violence, are significantly associated with health and social problems 
in adulthood (Anda et al. 2010, Nelson et al. 2012). The economic cost of domestic abuse to 
countries has been estimated at billions yearly (Walby 2009). Despite its prevalence and 
harmful impact on women and children, studies continue to show that domestic abuse is 
underreported and under-recorded (Lazenbatt et al. 2009, Bradbury-Jones et al. 2014).  
Serious Case Reviews (SCRs), undertaken in the UK to learn lessons from serious 
child maltreatment cases highlight the co-occurrence of domestic abuse and child 
maltreatment together with the grave outcomes that can occur when professionals fail to 
recognise and respond when children are exposed to violence (Cardiff LSCB 2013). It is 
acknowledged universally that child protection work is intrinsically difficult and high-risk, 
and that professionals from all agencies face numerous challenges and complex decisions in 
recognising and responding to children who are exposed to domestic abuse and maltreatment 
(Gilbert et al. 2009, Munro & Hubbard 2011). Despite this, child protection failures reinforce 
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the pressing need to find effective ways to appraise and improve the quality and safety of 
child safeguarding practices and the complex systems within which they reside.  
This century has seen a growing recognition in health care of the prevalence and 
inevitability of health care error, and a shift in approaches to appraising and improving the 
quality and safety of patient care processes (Plsek & Greenhalgh 2001, Armitage 2009). 
There has traditionally been a tendency to attribute the principal causes of errors to the 
failings of individual clinicians and to undertake reactive investigations following particular 
adverse incidents (analogous to SCRs). However, in the last 20 years there has been a shift 
towards a systems approach to safety which recognises that errors result from the failings of 
complex systems. In healthcare, the emphasis on a systems approach has also led to a more 
proactive form of risk management and improving safety before errors occur (Coles et al. 
2010, Lawton et al. 2015). A systems approach and indeed prospective safety evaluation have 
industry origins and have long been used in high-risk industries such as aviation and nuclear 
power. There are now calls for the adoption of a systems approach to evaluating and 
improving the quality and safety of social care practice and processes, both retrospectively in 
the review of particular adverse incidents, as well as prospectively prior  to and unrelated to 
specific incidents (Munro & Hubbard 2011, Armitage et al. 2012).  In common with health 
care, social care processes and systems are often and increasingly multi-professional and 
multi-agency, fast-paced and socio-technical; such parallels suggest that the systems and 
proactive approaches now espoused in health care could be usefully applied to social care. 
However, there are also clear differences between health and social care which has led to 
inevitable questions about the feasibility and utility of systems approaches for evaluating 
social care processes (Rawlings et al. 2014); for example, social care is less protocol-driven 
than health care, and professional judgements are more dependent on factors not amenable to 
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measurement. This has been robustly defended by Fish et al. (2008) who describe social care 
as a socio-technical system – one where people and technology interact. 
As health care has espoused industry-derived approaches to safety, so too has it 
looked to adopt industry-based methods and tools for assessing and improving safety. One 
tool that has received considerable attention is Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA), a 
risk assessment methodology used to identify potential vulnerabilities in complex, high-risk 
processes and to generate corrective strategies to counteract these before they result in 
adverse events (Ashley et al. 2011).  A multidisciplinary team of subject matter experts 
typically undertakes a FMEA over a series of team meetings and, although several variants 
exist, FMEA has a formal, sequential process (shown in Figure 1).    
 
Figure 1: Five stages of a FMEA (Ashley et al, 2011) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
             
 
In order to effect change the corrective actions described in Step 5 must of course be 
implemented and should subsequently be monitored to assess impact. FMEA has been 
successfully used to proactively assess and improve the safety of a range of different health 
care processes in numerous settings and countries including medicines management, blood 
transfusion and organ transplantation (e.g. Burgmeier et al. 2008, Steinberger et al. 2009, 
1) Map the process under evaluation to identify its component steps  
2) Identify failure modes (potential errors) for each process step 
3) Numerically score the failure modes to prioritise them according to the 
risk they pose 
4) Identify possible causes for the highest-risk failure modes (and based on 
these) 
5) Generate corrective actions to address them 
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Armitage et al. 2011, Ashley et al. 2011). Despite the extensive use of FMEA in health care, 
it appears that FMEA has not to date been used to appraise and improve the quality and 
safety of a social care process.   
In a project commissioned by the UK National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty 
to Children (NSPCC), we explored the feasibility and utility of using FMEA to evaluate an 
aspect of a child safeguarding social care process. Specifically, we used a modified FMEA 
methodology to evaluate the process for recognising a child who is exposed to domestic 
abuse and responding in terms of making a referral to social care services for children and 
young people. This paper reports a summary of the FMEA process, including illustrative 
examples of the failure modes and corrective actions generated. Given the novel and 
exploratory nature of using FMEA in a social care context, we also collected feedback from 
the FMEA team.  Finally, as potential impact was important to commissioners and the Local 
Safeguarding Children’s Board (LSCB), we reflect on and provide future recommendations 
for the use of a prospective systems approach, and specifically FMEA, in appraising social 
care processes and practice.  This paper will be of interest to service managers, LSCB 
members, commissioners, front line practitioners and researchers, particularly those who are 
involved in child protection and/or who are looking to use a proactive, systems-based 
approach to improve social care processes.  
The Process 
Setting  
The FMEA was undertaken between July and October 2012 in a city in the English midlands 
in partnership with the city council’s LSCB.   The Boards in England have a mandatory duty 
to co-ordinate how agencies work together to protect children and to ensure effectiveness of 
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those arrangements (HM Government 2015). The city’s population of approximately 250,000 
is ethnically and linguistically diverse and is relatively deprived in national terms, although 
deprivation levels vary considerably across city wards (Office for National Statistics, 2014). 
The city has a higher than national average rate of referrals relating to safeguarding and 
family support. As the FMEA was classified as a quality improvement project, and did not 
involve service users or any review of social care records, ethical and governance approvals 
were not required.  However, permissions to recruit staff from local teams and discuss their 
SCR processes were given by the LSCB, and all participation was voluntary. The LSCB 
location is not revealed and all discussions were confidential and reported anonymously. 
FMEA Team  
The FMEA team (Figure 2) comprised 10 frontline professionals with day-to-day 
responsibility for safeguarding children. Team members were recruited from several different 
professional groups, and possessed varying levels of experience and seniority. The team 
included a senior manager with a role in shaping policy and practice as well as being a 
member of the LSCB.  
 
 
Figure 2. Composition of the FMEA team; TM = team member  
Social work  TM-1 Senior Social Worker, Children and Young People’s Department 
 TM-2 Social Work Manager, Children and Young People’s Department 
Health care TM-3 School Nurse 
 TM-4 Named Midwife, local hospital 
 TM-5 Young Persons Substance Misuse Commissioner and Safeguarding Lead  
 TM-6 Designated Safeguarding Nurse & Local Safeguarding Children Board member 
Education TM-7 Assistant Head / Child Protection Officer, local pupil referral unit 
Police  TM-8 Police Constable, local Constabulary   
 TM-9 Detective Sergeant, local Constabulary   
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 TM-10 Detective Chief Inspector, local Constabulary   
 
Team meetings were led and facilitated by a senior NSPCC consultant with a 
background in children’s social work; the role of the facilitator incorporated setting ground 
rules, assuring participants were not threatened by any part of the process, could withdraw if 
they felt distressed, and were able to raise negative issues without compunction.  This team 
leader was supported by two academic researchers  with experience of FMEA in health care 
settings, following recommendations that FMEA teams also include ‘outsiders’ so as to 
facilitate the team’s adoption of a critical but unbiased approach (DeRosier et al. 2002, 
Ashley et al. 2010a). An administrator made a contemporaneous record of all team meetings. 
FMEA Procedure 
We employed a modified FMEA methodology. As noted earlier, FMEA traditionally entails a 
prioritisation step whereby failure modes are numerically scored, typically on the basis of 
their likely severity (S), occurrence (O) and detectability (D), and these scores are then 
multiplied in order to obtain a risk priority number (RPN), where higher numbers indicate 
greater safety risk (e.g. Armitage et al. 2011). However, recent literature appraising the use of 
FMEA in health care has questioned the reliability and validity of FMEA risk scoring and the 
consequent prioritisation of failure modes, and highlighted the mathematical violations and 
limitations of calculating a RPN by SOD multiplication (Ashley & Armitgae 2010b, Franklin  
et al. 2012, Shebl et al. 2012). Additionally, although failure mode scoring is undertaken to 
help focus attention and resources towards greatest risk, it does ultimately mean that many 
potential but low-scoring failure modes are simply ignored. Reflecting on the recent critique 
of FMEA risk scoring, and the current project’s novel application of FMEA methodology in a 
social care context, the team decided it was neither feasible nor desirable to prioritise the 
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failure modes. Therefore, causes and corrective actions were generated for all potential 
failure modes, rather than just for a high-scoring subset. 
The FMEA was undertaken over seven 3-hour face-to-face team meetings, spaced 
approximately biweekly. Over the course of these meetings, the team undertook the 
methodological steps detailed in Figure 1 (except step 3). Although the process for 
recognising and referring a child exposed to domestic abuse is governed by local and national 
policies, the team did not map the process and identify failure modes (and so on) according to 
such policies, but rather, according to the team’s current, local practice. To facilitate the 
identification of failure modes, and the subsequent generation of related causes and corrective 
actions, the academic researchers encouraged the team to consider potential failure modes at 
the level of the individual, in relation to local conditions, and at an organisational level (also 
termed latent conditions). It was explained to the team that latent conditions are not seen as 
direct causes, but as contributory factors that are necessary for any causal agents (more 
proximal to failure modes) to generate an impact.  In line with this thinking we also indicated 
that front line practitioners rarely instigate organisational failures but often inherit the 
(problematic) latent conditions, (e.g. poorly designed IT systems, training inadequacies) 
(Reason 2008).  Outside meetings, the team leader synthesised, documented and circulated 
the session’s output for team member review and comment. 
Evaluation  
Team members completed an evaluation questionnaire and a semi-structured interview to 
provide feedback on the FMEA project. The feedback questionnaire was completed 
anonymously online and included items on the composition of the FMEA team and meeting 
administration, the perceived usefulness and value of the FMEA, and the experience of taking 
part. The feedback interviews were undertaken face-to-face (with the exception of one 
11 
 
11 
 
telephone interview).  To encourage candid feedback, interviews were conducted 
individually, by a doctoral student uninvolved in the FMEA.  
Findings 
Process mapping 
The process for recognising and referring a child exposed to domestic abuse was mapped out 
in ten main steps, from the point of receiving information about a child (e.g. through first-
hand observation or by email from a third-party) - which arouses a suspicion that the child is 
exposed to domestic abuse (steps 1 & 2) - to the point of making a child protection referral to 
social care services and confirming receipt of this referral (steps 9 & 10). Five of the main 
steps had numerous sub-steps; e.g. the fifth step ‘analyse information received’ had three sub-
steps including review of all the information to hand, identification of the features of 
domestic abuse within the information and documentation. The final version of the process 
map generated by the FMEA team included a categorised list of ‘influencing factors’, such as 
personal values, fear of retribution and co-worker morale, which the team saw as having a 
bearing on professional decisions and actions at various steps in the process.  Although 
atypical of FMEA mapping, efforts to incorporate such social influences into the map are 
perhaps inevitable given the highly interpersonal nature of the process under examination.   
Identifying failure modes 
In total, 121 failure modes were identified. We present here some illustrative examples of the 
failure modes for three particular steps of the process.  For the fourth step ‘gather further 
information’ and sub-steps, 22 failure modes were generated. These included failure to gather 
a sufficiently adequate amount of information, failure to gather information from appropriate 
sources, and making attempts to gather further information but being unsuccessful (i.e. efforts 
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being thwarted). A total of 17 failure modes were identified for the fifth step ‘analyse 
information received’ and sub-steps, and included: not analysing all the information to hand, 
identifying too few of the features of domestic abuse and wrongly identifying such features. 
For the seventh step ‘make judgement on child’s exposure to domestic abuse’ 18 failure 
modes were generated, including wrongly identifying the risk and/or protective factors, not 
using a tool to weigh these factors against each other and not ultimately determining the 
balance of risk to the child.  
Identifying causes  
Ninety-seven individual causes for the failure modes were identified, with many applicable to 
more than one failure mode. Some causes were identified at the level of the individual, in 
association with specific local conditions and organisational level factors. Individual-level 
causes included professionals’ lacking knowledge and confidence, and becoming desensitised 
to childhood trauma and abuse, potentially then having higher thresholds for safeguarding 
concerns. The causes generated by the team which were thought to relate to local conditions 
included: workload and time pressures, inaccessible supervision and peer-guidance, and 
having a ‘competing’ work goal or orientation deflecting attention from protecting children. 
For example, professionals may be focused on other work priorities (e.g. teaching in a 
classroom) or oriented towards the adults in a domestic situation (e.g. pregnancy or drug 
misuse). At an organisational level, causes included policies and procedures that were seen as 
overly administratively burdensome to the point of obstruction, and difficulties with cross-
agency communication due to differences in information and communications technology 
(e.g. causing emails to be blocked by firewalls), terminology and agreed standards of best 
practice. For example, team members noted that social work records are largely inaccessible 
for children new to a locality, because in their experience records stay with the social worker 
rather than move with the child. Other causes were also identified which might be considered 
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‘case specific’, such as fear of (family) retribution, language barriers and worries about 
accusations of racism across different cultures.  
Generating corrective actions  
A total of 34 corrective actions was generated. The actions were diverse and included 
changes focused on policy and procedures, information technology, professional awareness 
and training, and practitioner tools and documentation, and changes which were aimed at 
addressing causes at the individual, local and organisational levels. The team’s suggested 
changes to policy and procedures included a need (possibly for LSCBs) to audit and monitor 
local schools to ensure they all have an accessible child protection policy and that such 
policies are consistent, along with the need to establish a transfer protocol within social work 
for the handover of pertinent social care records when a child moves to a new locality. A 
cluster of corrective actions focused on information technology included, in the short-term, 
using workarounds to prevent cross-agency email communications from being blocked (e.g. 
typing s-ex rather than sex), and, in the longer-term, reviewing and adjusting agencies’ 
firewalls to stop legitimate communications from being blocked. Actions around professional 
awareness and training included, at a simple level, holding local multi-agency child 
protection training sessions at schools to facilitate the attendance of teachers (which is 
historically low), and, more ambitiously, developing a local network of domestic abuse 
champions or ‘safeguarding stars’ who model good practice and help to promote awareness 
of and dispel common ‘myths’ around domestic abuse. It was suggested that a third sector 
organisation might spearhead the establishment of such an initiative. Suggested revisions to 
practitioner tools and documentation included developing compulsory prompt questions for 
enquiring about domestic abuse and adding these questions to key documents across agencies 
(e.g. midwife assessment forms, police interview forms). The team also recommended a 
review of the nationally-used Domestic Abuse, Stalking and Honour-based violence checklist 
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(DASH) (Richards 2009) for risk assessment, and for this review to include consideration of 
adding to the DASH an explicit risk classification for each child of the adult ‘victim’.  
Evaluation questionnaire and interviews 
All ten team members completed the feedback questionnaire, and the closed-responses across 
most domains were generally very positive. The composition of the FMEA team and the way 
meetings were run was highly valued and it was seen as helpful having outsider perspectives 
with no familiarity with the child protection system. The team was unanimous in saying they 
both understood the FMEA process and could speak freely during meetings. In terms of 
perceived utility and value of the FMEA, there was team unanimous agreement that each of 
the methodological steps (see Figure 1) had been very useful or useful, that it “has been worth 
my time and effort”, and had provided new insights into other professional perspectives. The 
experience of taking part was seen as both motivating and enjoyable.  All team members 
participated in a short feedback interviews.  All team members said they thought FMEA was 
an effective methodology 
If it came to a question of would you use it again for this kind of social, dynamic 
social situation or not, then I would say yes. It has real world value [TM-8]  
Having come to the end now, I think it has been a really effective process…I have 
seen it as quite beneficial [TM-4] 
Team members commented positively on the detail demanded by an FMEA and welcomed 
the protected ‘time out’ to reflect systematically and deeply on processes and practice. 
….it’s very effective in terms of the amount of detail it goes into…corrective actions 
they obviously make so much sense ‘cos they flowed from all the detailed work that 
they do, so I think the methodology’s really valuable [TM-2] 
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Team members valued the collaborative nature of FMEA and appreciated the opportunity to 
carefully examine aspects of child safeguarding processes with other professionals. There 
was widespread acknowledgement that for the FMEA to be worthwhile and truly effective 
the outcomes must be translated into practice. Team members perceived implementation of 
the corrective actions to be a shared responsibility and intimated that they had in some cases 
already begun to make changes to their systems and/or personal practice. During the FMEA 
the team decided by consensus not to prioritise the failure modes.  The majority of the team 
highlighted the difficulty of risk scoring, and said that they thought failure modes should not 
be prioritised. 
You start to question, actually, can one of them be prioritised over another”; “I think 
it feels unsafe to do it [TM-5] 
The team strongly believed their involvement had provided considerable learning, increasing 
their knowledge and understanding of the different roles and internal working processes of 
other agencies, and about their drivers and challenges. It was also felt that taking part in the 
FMEA had extended and/or enhanced their professional networks. 
I learned a hell of a lot about what the police perceive I do, what they do. It was 
fantastic for me, me seeing colleagues from a different discipline. Who I work 
alongside but I realise I never actually understood how they did what they did [TM-1] 
Discussion  
This exploratory service evaluation used a modified FMEA methodology to evaluate the 
process for recognising and referring children exposed to domestic abuse.  Despite the 
growing use of FMEA in health care, to our knowledge, this is the first application of FMEA 
to appraise and improve the quality and safety of a social care process.  Also it is one of the 
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first attempts to respond to the call for a whole systems approach in error management and 
specifically addresses the proposed use of FMEA as a means of generating multi-agency 
learning (Munro 2011).  Here we reflect on and discuss the feasibility and utility of using 
FMEA in a social care context.  Finally, we provide recommendations for all those involved 
in the prevention of domestic abuse, as well as researchers in the field who may be looking to 
use proactive systems approaches like FMEA as a means of evaluation.  
Feasibility of FMEA in a social care context  
This project show that is feasible to apply FMEA to a social care process – albeit using a 
modified methodology in terms of scoring and mapping.  Like others (Franklin et al. 2012, 
Shebl et al. 2012), we have become sceptical of the validity of failure mode scoring and so 
we chose to omit this element of the methodology. In the feedback interviews after 
completion of the FMEA, most team members expressed doubt that failure mode scoring was 
possible or desirable.  We agree with the FMEA team in that scoring all failure modes 
(assigning a score to the likely occurrence and severity, and the detectability) would have 
been particularly difficult in a social care context as the process under evaluation does not 
occur in a small-scale space such as a factory or hospital ward, but rather the large 
geographical area of a city and is being analysed from the various perspectives of different 
professionals, who are also, importantly, from different agencies.  Tangential to the 
challenges of scoring failure modes, the team also found it difficult to map the process under 
scrutiny.  In response to this, and unusually for a FMEA, the map included a list of 
‘influencing factors’ which impact upon professionals’ decisions and actions at various steps 
of the process – this allowed such factors to be acknowledged and drawn upon in the later 
FMEA steps, but also to be ‘contained’ such that a useable map could still be created.  In 
order to map social care processes which are less protocol-driven than processes in industry 
and health care, and which involve professional judgements which are more dependent on 
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unmeasurable factors, it will likely be necessary to generate modified process maps such as 
this one. We argue that this does not diminish the value of the FMEA, indeed we believe that 
it enhances the way in which a complex, social process is shown to exist. 
Despite the pivotal role school teachers occupy for recognising and protecting 
children exposed to domestic abuse (Crosson-Tower 2003), it proved difficult to recruit 
representatives from education to the FMEA team, and in the feedback interviews several 
team members expressed their disappointment at the underrepresentation of education. Our 
difficulty recruiting teachers may be simply be a reflection of their workload pressures 
(Johnson et al. 2005), or be unique to this project, although there is evidence to indicate that 
many teachers’ lack knowledge and confidence about child protection (McGarry & Buckley 
2013) and this could have undermined their confidence to join the FMEA team. We highlight 
the underrepresentation of education on our team for others to consider and address as a 
potential barrier when planning children’s social care FMEAs. 
We have demonstrated that it is possible to use FMEA in a social care context, 
however, it is only practicable provided there is sufficient protected time for team members 
and that they receive unconditional managerial support. Managerial support is more likely to 
be received when FMEA meetings are facilitated effectively; making certain that time is not 
devoted to marginal issues (Carlson 2012).  
Utility and acceptability of FMEA in a social care context  
The utility of the FMEA can be judged positively in two key ways. First, although the 
FMEA inevitably raised and ‘replicated’ perennial issues and challenges around safeguarding 
children such as interagency communication, decisions on role boundaries and threshold 
decisions (Sidebotham 2012),  it also generated novel insights into a complex process 
embedded in a complex socio-technical system.  This was evident in the team’s 
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acknowledgement of the impact of various interrelating factors such as staff failing to refer 
appropriately due to uncertainty about existing procedures alongside technical factors, such 
as emails containing terms common to the description of domestic abuse being blocked by 
poorly calibrated firewalls.  Furthermore, new ideas were advanced for service improvement 
which did not appear to have been previously considered in the locality (e.g. multi-agency 
training sessions on domestic abuse to be held at schools to encourage education sector 
attendance).  Second, many team members felt that they had personally benefitted from 
participating in the FMEA, notably in terms of gaining increased understanding of other 
professionals’ roles and challenges and, related to this, improved  team working and 
communication. These team-building benefits of FMEA have been noted by others 
(Steinberger et al. 2009, Ashley et al. 2011). Given the central and persistent role of 
communication failures in adverse events in healthcare (Sutcliffe et al. 2004, Lawton et al. in 
press), and across the various agencies in social care (DH/Home Office 2003, Laming 2009), 
the reported benefit of participation in the analysis for team members would seem to be a 
strong benefit. The feedback from the team members suggests that these benefits are owed, at 
least in part, to the prospective, systems-approach of the methodology, participants having 
indicated that they felt able to be forthright and candid, in contrast to SCRs where it was 
suggested that they would be far more cautious and indeed defensive. 
The FMEA process resembles what one might see from in an experience based co-
design (EBCD) process where patients and staff work together directly drawing on their 
experience to redesign a service, although a bespoke EBCD here would likely involve public 
representatives and as such, we recommend future FMEAs in this sphere of practice consider 
public involvement.    Therefore we believe that the FMEA process, especially in relation to 
organisational level corrective actions, be considered by service managers as complementary 
to other user-driven feedback mechanisms. We argue that a prospective approach is an 
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obvious way forward, yielding considerably more information than a retrospective approach 
– largely because organisational failures in social care (especially involving children) can 
have the most catastrophic of outcomes; investigations can be easily blighted by hindsight 
bias (Henrikson & Kaplan 2003); and the results of an investigation are often highly and 
emotively publicised.  Furthermore, it is not uncommon for the front line workers involved to 
be demonised and blamed by media and public (Lonne & Parton 2014).  Lastly, the nature of 
the professional-client relationship is different in social care to health – sometimes 
characterised by defensiveness and anger rather than gratitude (Bradbury-Jones et al. 2014).  
In this FMEA we attempted to enhance a whole systems approach by encouraging the team to 
move away from individual culpability and towards a contributory factors approach where 
the reason for failure is almost always multi-factorial.   
Impact 
Following this work, the NSPCC used FMEA during 2013 to explore supervisory processes 
within the delivery of NSPCC services.  Given that NSPCC is a UK-wide service and travel 
is an issue, senior managers, in consultation with NSPCC staff who had experience of FMEA 
from this domestic abuse project, adapted the FMEA format to enable the process to be 
completed over two full day sessions. The FMEA facilitator employed on the domestic abuse 
FMEA reported here provided the internal expert advice on both the planning and 
implementation of the FMEA and led the facilitation. However, in contrast to here, the 
improvement team also developed the implementation plan.  Overall, FMEA was seen to be a 
suitable process for identifying problems in a given system.  On the basis of the FMEA 
outcome, the NSPCC was able to target specific problems and revise the supervisory 
processes accordingly. 
20 
 
20 
 
Future recommendations for using FMEA as part of a whole systems 
approach in social care  
In summary, we offer a number of recommendations: 
1. Underpinning a FMEA with established theory on accident causation and human error 
can enhance the depth of analysis but also serve to give participants the confidence 
and competence to recognise the ubiquity of error and the futility of individual blame 
in managing failure.   
2. FMEA is time consuming and therefore costly.  However, a ‘mini-mapping’ (step 1, 
Figure 1) could be of benefit especially for team building, empathic understanding 
and raising misunderstandings, highlighting discrepancy between policy and practice.   
In essence however, while cost is a major consideration, it is dwarfed by the cost of an 
inquiry after a major failure. 
3. The nature and context of social care, and specifically safeguarding against domestic 
abuse, is not amenable to the scoring of failure modes, or indeed their prioritisation  
4. Team members require protected time to attend and with managerial support  
5. Management should be represented in the team and have a designated responsibility 
(with LSCBs) to develop an action plan for reviewing and (if agreed) implementing 
any recommended changes.  A local ‘champion’ who is a front line professional 
should be appointed directly from the team to support management for the duration of 
the action plan.  
6. Future FMEAs here are likely to be enhanced by public involvement, and initiated 
from the first stage; a lay perspective would be especially helpful in generating 
corrective actions.  Additionally, public involvement in analysing failure is an 
important step in advancing transparency and professional accountability. 
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7. A FMEA is not static - it is an illustration of practice at one time.  It is essential that 
the process originally scrutinised is revisited.  We suggest that any repeat FMEA 
would not need to be as resource intensive.  
8. FMEA facilitators should not only be conversant with the FMEA process but also a 
systems approach to organisational failures and have experience of working with 
multi-agency teams who are very likely be working together on a potentially sensitive 
topic. 
Limitations of this work  
We were unable to develop a full multi-agency picture of the process under scrutiny or how it 
might be improved due to the lack of consistent attendance from education representatives, 
something seen as a particular weakness by the FMEA team.  Second, although 
generalisability of FMEA findings is commonly cited as a limitation, we are confident that 
the failure modes identified would resonate with all those in the field as being repeatedly 
reported in major inquiries and that this work strongly suggests they continue to pose a threat 
to the welfare of children exposed to domestic abuse.  Third, the extent of system-wide 
change following the FMEA has been difficult to establish; and although we are aware of 
changes in NSPCC practice, our fifth recommendation reflects the need for a more focused 
approach on implementing change post-FMEA.  
Conclusion 
Domestic abuse is acknowledged as a public health issue of epidemic proportions and 
seemingly on the rise. The seriousness of exposure to domestic abuse for children is 
increasingly being recognised. Whilst response to this issue is variable, attempts to appraise 
processes around this with a view to making service and response seamless and timely are 
important.  Although the child protection process is unwieldy and complex, systematic and 
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prospective quality assurance methodologies can be applied with success.  Our use of FMEA 
within one safeguarding board locality demonstrated that for a focused issue (response to 
domestic abuse exposure), FMEA was possible and helpful in a child protection situation.  It 
was neither possible nor desirable to ‘score’ failure modes and mapping the process was 
difficult. Nonetheless, the FMEA process was hugely beneficial in demonstrating the 
existence of wider influences within a complex situation. We have demonstrated that whilst it 
is possible to use FMEA within child protection, it is only practicable if there is managerial 
support and sufficient protected time. In balance though, whilst FMEA is costly in staff time, 
the human and economic costs of domestic abuse are so great, and the potential outcomes for 
children so severe, that FMEA and other human factors approaches may be beneficial in the 
longer term. 
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